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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

FORFEITURE, INNOCENCE IS NOT A DEFENSE
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
Henry G. Gyden***
Petitioner's husband was observed engaging in a sexual act with a
prostitute in a parked automobile, which was jointly owned by the petitioner2
and her husband.' Petitioner's husband was convicted of gross indecency.
After the conviction the State sued petitioner and her husband to have their
automobile declared a public nuisance3 and abated.4 Petitioner defended
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Fall 1996.
** B.S., 1994, Florida A & M University. This comment is dedicated to my parents,
Henry and Evelyn Gyden, who have guided me throughout my life. I thank you for your love
and understanding.
1. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 996 (1996).
2. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486
(Mich. 1995). Petitioner's husband, John Bennis, was arrested for gross indecency on October
3, 1988. Id. That evening, two Detroit police officers observed Mr. Bennis, driving a 1977
Pontiac, pick up a woman from a street comer. Id. The officers followed the car, which
turned around and then parked. Id. The officers next noticed the woman's head disappear
towards the driver's side of the vehicle. The officers immediately approached the car and
witnessed the woman performing a sexual act with Mr. Bennis. Id.
3. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. Section 600.3801 of the Michigan Compiled Laws states
in pertinent part:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes
or other disorderly persons[] ... is declared a nuisance ....
and all ... nuisances
shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court
rules.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.3801 (1995).
4. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. Section 600.3825 of the Michigan Compiled Laws states
in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action
as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the
judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or
place of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof
in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution ....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance
within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any
furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
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against the forfeiture of her one-half interest in the car by asserting that she
was not aware of her husband's illegal activity.5 Respondent asserted that
Michigan's forfeiture statute authorizes the forfeiture of an owner's property
without proof that the owner knew of the existence of the nuisance.' The
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the State
must prove that the owner knew of the nuisance before forfeiture. 7 The
Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the
State does not need to prove that the owner knew of or agreed to the illegal
use of the automobile.'
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,9
affirmed and HELD, that the forfeiture statute's failure to provide an
"innocent owner" defense was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Court has allowed the forfeiture of property belonging to owners
who allowed someone to use their property, but who had no knowledge that
the person would use their property illegally." However, the Court has
never decided on the constitutionality of taking property from a "truly
innocent owner,"" one who was not only unaware of the illegal use, but
also has done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal use

§ 600.3825 (1987).
5. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
6. Id. Section 600.3815 of the Michigan Compiled Laws states in pertinent part: "(2)
Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of
them, is not required." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3815(2) (1987).
7. State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Auth. v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993). The trial court allowed the forfeiture without any division of the sale's
proceeds to recognize petitioner's one-half interest. Id. at 732. The Michigan Court of
Appeals quoted People v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456 (Mich. 1927), which stated, "[T]he
statute does not deprive one person of the use of his property by reason of the illegal acts of
another, unless the owner's use bears a participating relation to the violation." Bennis, 504
N.W.2d at 731.
8. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
9. Bennis, 116 U.S. at 997-98.
10. Id. at 1001. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
12. Id. at 617. The Court distinguished innocent owners who were merely unaware of the
illegal use of their property from owners who not only were unaware of the illegal use but
also had done everything that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use. Id. at
616-17; see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson, 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (stating that forfeiture was
based on the owner's negligence in allowing the property to be used illegally). This principle
stems from the Court's past rulings in which the Court has stated that the forfeiture of
property belonging to innocent persons is based on the negligence of owners in allowing their
property to be used illegally. Id. at 617. Thus, the Court has reserved the question of whether
the property of a "true innocent owner," one who is not guilty of any wrong or negligence,
can be forfeited under due process. Id. This is the question addressed in this comment.
MICH. COMP. LAWS
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of the property. 3 Indeed, the Court has reserved this question in many past
decisions. 4
The Court's earliest decision that allowed the civil forfeiture of property

even though the owner did not know of its illegal use was The Palmyra.5
In The Palmyra, a ship that had been commissioned by the King of Spain
was involved in the commission of various acts of piracy against U.S.
vessels. 6 The Palmyra Court addressed whether an owner's property could
be forfeited without the owner's conviction for the underlying crime.' 7 The
Court determined that a civil forfeiture created by statute does not depend on
the guilt of the owner.' 8 Justice Story, writing for the majority, stated that
the property itself was considered the guilty offender, or conversely, the
offense was attached to the property.' 9 Thus, regardless of the owner's guilt
or innocence, the "guilty" property can be forfeited in a civil proceeding.20
Since The Palmyra, the Court has heard several other cases dealing with
the forfeiture of property belonging to persons unaware of the property's
illegal use, culminating in the landmark case Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.21 In Calero-Toledo, appellee's yacht was seized from the
lessees after the authorities discovered marihuana on board the yacht.22 The
Calero-Toledo Court addressed whether a forfeiture statute violated the
Constitution if it was applied to the property of an innocent owner.23 The
Court, citing several cases including The Palmyra,24 determined that past

13. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.

14. Id. at 617 (citing Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921) and
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 691 (1974) (noting that the
forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property would raise "serious constitutional questions")).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

25 U.S. 1 (1827).
Id.at 8.
Id.at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. The guilty property fiction came from the common law of England. Id. In cases

of felonies, the forfeiture of goods stemmed from the defendant's conviction of a crime. Id.
However, this principle did not apply to forfeitures created by statute for violations of the
revenue laws. Id. In such cases, the property itself was considered the guilty party. Id. The
guilty property principle also applies in admiralty cases. Id.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 663.

22. Id. at 665-68. In Calero-Toledo,authorities seized appellee's yacht from the lessees,
and charged one of the lessees with violation of the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico.
Id. The authorities later seized the yacht for forfeiture. Id. Appellee was not aware of the
seizure until they attempted to retrieve the yacht from the lessee who was delinquent in rental
payments. Id. at 668. The appellee was not aware of the illegal use of the yacht, and in fact,
had included a provision in the rental agreement that specifically prohibited the use of the
yacht for unlawful purposes. Id. at 693.
23. Id. at 669. The trial court held that the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute was
unconstitutional because it allowed the seizure of property that belonged to innocent owners
without compensation. Id. at 668-69.
24. Id.at 683.
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decisions have not allowed the innocence of the property owner as a
defense.25 Moreover, it reasoned that the property forfeiture prevented the
future illegal use of the property and induced owners to exercise greater care
when relinquishing possession of their property. 26 Furthermore, the Court
stated that forfeiture in such cases can be imposed due to the owner's
negligence in allowing the property to be used illegally.27 Thus, it
concluded that the innocence of the property owner is not a defense.2 8
However, the Court stated, in dicta, that the forfeiture of property, belonging
to an owner who not only was unaware of the illegal use of the property, but
also had taken all reasonable steps to guard against such use, may violate due
process.29
After Calero-Toledo,there was still confusion among the lower courts as
to whether certain constitutional protections applied to civil forfeitures.30
The Supreme Court addressed some of these concerns in Austin v. United
States.3' In Austin, after the petitioner plead guilty to possessing cocaine
with the intent to distribute, the United States brought a civil action against
the petitioner's mobile home and auto body shop.32 The Austin Court
addressed whether the forfeiture statute was subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.33 In reaching its decision, the Court
stated that there are two theories that support the forfeiture of property owned
by innocent persons: the property itself was "guilty" of the crime, and
owners are strictly liable for the illegal acts committed with their property by

25. Id. at 680.
26. Id. at 687.
27. Id. at 686. The principle of guilty property holds ".[that such misfortunes are in
part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore, he is properly punishable by such
forfeiture."' " Id. (quoting Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(quoting Blackstone)).
28. Id. at 683. The Court stated that "[d]espite this proliferation of forfeiture enactments,
the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected
as a defense." Id.
29. Id. at 689. The Court did not consider the leasing company a "true" innocent owner
for two reasons. Id. at 688-90. First, the forfeiture would provide an incentive for lessors to
take precautions when leasing property to ensure that lessees are not using the lessor's
property illegally. Id. at 688. In this sense, the Court considered the lessor negligent. Id.
Secondly, the lessor in this case never asserted, nor was it shown, that the lessor had done
everything that could reasonably be expected to prevent the forfeiture. Id. at 690.
30. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606 (1993). The Court stated that it "granted
certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict ... over the applicability of the Eighth Amendment
to in rem civil forfeitures." Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 604. The trial court granted summary judgment, rejecting Austin's argument
that forfeiture would violate his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 605.
33. Id. at 604. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
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those to whom they give consent to use the property.34 The Court asserted
that both theories are grounded on the premise that the owner was negligent
in allowing the property to be used illegally.3 Moreover, it stated that if
civil forfeiture is based on an owner's negligence, then the forfeiture must be
a type of fine for that negligence.36 Thus, the Court concluded that civil
forfeiture is, at least in part, punishment 37 and as such, is subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.38 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that since property forfeiture, in
some cases, is a punishment, there is a constitutional question as to whether
or not the owner's personal negligence was required by due process.3 9
In the instant case, the Court decided whether the Michigan forfeiture
statute's failure to provide an innocent owner defense was a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 ° Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the petitioner was not
constitutionally entitled to defend the forfeiture by showing she was unaware
of her husband's illegal intention." In reaching this decision, the Court,
ciLng vasiouS prior cases, stated that an owner's property may be forfeited

due to the illegal use of the property, regardless of whether the owner knew
of the illegal use.42 Moreover, the Court rejected as obiter dictum the claim
that it would be unconstitutional to forfeit the property of an owner who not

34. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 614 n.7.
37. See id. at 619; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1004-06 1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). If a forfeiture can be classified as punishment then it is subject to the Eighth
Amendment's protection against excessive fines. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609. Whether a civil
forfeiture is classified as punishment depends on whether the property is considered
contraband or an instrumentality of the crime. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Contraband is any property that is inherently illegal, such as burglar tools, drugs,
or sawed-off shotguns. Id. Conversely, an instrumentality is property that is used to facilitate
crime, such as a factory that is used to produce drugs or a truck that is used to transport
illegal guns. Id. The Court determined that the forfeiture of contraband is not punishment,
and thus, it is not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, because forfeiture serves the purpose
of removing inherently illegal property from the public. Id. Thus, even if an illegal gun is
worth $10 million, the government may forfeit it without compensating the owner. However,
the forfeiture of instrumentalities may be considered punishment, thereby subjecting such
forfeiture to the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause, unless the forfeiture is strictly remedial.
Id. at 1004-05; see also Joseph B. Harrington, Note, Austin v. United States: Forfeitures as
Punishmentand the Implicationsfor Warrantless Seizures, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 415 (1995).
38. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
39. Id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated, "At some point, we may
have to confront the constitutional question whether forfeiture is permitted when the owner
has committed no wrong of any sort, intentional or negligent. That for me would raise a
serious question." Id.
40. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 997.
41. Id. at 998.
42. Id.
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only was unaware of the illegal use of the property, but also had done
everything that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use.43
The Court indicated that the petitioner in the instant case had made no
showing beyond the fact that she was unaware of the property's illegal use,
which in prior cases was not held to be a defense."
Furthermore, the instant Court analogized the instant case to negligent
driving in which vicarious liability is imposed on an owner for the negligent
driving by a person to whom the owner entrusted the use of a vehicle.45
Additionally, the Court noted that in several areas of the law, property
owners are liable for the actions of persons they entrust with their property.46 Therefore, the Court reasoned that owners must bear the risk of
forfeiture when they allow their property to leave their control and it is used
illegally.47
With this decision, the instant Court established that there is no
constitutionally required innocent owner defense.48 In effect, the Court
eliminated the defense even for owners who were not negligent or engaged
in wrongdoing.49 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that prior cases have
established that the guilt or innocence of the owner is not a factor in allowing
the forfeiture of property." Dissenting, Justice Stevens stated that the Court
incorrectly dismissed as obiter dictum the "truly innocent owner" principle
stated in Calero-Toledo." Justice Stevens reasoned that prior cases
establish that the truly innocent owner principle does exist and is required by
due process. 2 The majority, however, rejected the dissent's interpretation
of prior case law and concluded that innocence is a defense only when the
property is used without the owner's consent. 3
The instant Court correctly concludes that the truly innocent owner
principle was obiter dictum in prior cases;54 however, given the Court's
holding in Austin, the principle should be applied to the instant case. In
43. Id. at 999.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1000.
46. Id. at 998; see, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926) (discussing
civil forfeiture in the law of admiralty, liens, and bailments).
47. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
48. Id. at 999.
49. Id. The Court did not prohibit the innocent owner defense, but held that it is not
constitutionally required. Id. Because most forfeiture statutes include an innocent owner
defense, the effect of the instant case may not be great. See Mary M. Cheh, What Price Civil
Forfeiture? ConstitutionalImplications and Reform Initiatives, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1,
27 (1994).
50. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
51. Id. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 999 n.5.
54. Id. at 999.
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Austin, the Court stated that throughout forfeiture history, cases allowing the
forfeiture of property belonging to innocent owners were based on two
theories: the property is "guilty" of the crime, and owners are strictly liable
for the crimes committed by persons to whom the owners have entrusted
their property." Furthermore, the Austin Court stated that both of these
theories are grounded on the premise that the owner is negligent in allowing
the property to be used illegally, and forfeiture is the proper punishment for
that negligence.56
Accordingly, in the instant case, Justice Stevens
concludes in his dissent that since the petitioner was in no way negligent, due
process prohibits the forfeiture." Moreover, Justice Stevens asserts that the
law never punishes a person who is not guilty of any wrongdoing," and as
punishment, the forfeiture in the instant case should not be allowed.59
The Court, however, fails to address this analysis and instead, retreats
from its holding in Austin.6' The instant Court cites cases that justify the
forfeiture of property owned by innocent persons based on the theories of
"guilty" property, and vicarious and strict liability for property owners.6 1
But the Court fails to reiterate its holding in Austin that these theories are
based on the negligence of the property owner and thus, justify the
punishment of property forfeiture.62 This retreat from the holding in Austin
follows the Court's assertion that the innocence or guilt of the owner is
irrelevant.63 However, the Court fails to expressly state whether it is

55. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Southern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher,
238 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1915) (prohibiting punishment under the Due Process Clause for acts
that involved "no intentional wrongdoing; no departure from any prescribed or known standard
of action, and no reckless conduct").
59. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416, 683 U.S. 663 (1974)
(stating that the innocence of an owner has always been rejected as a defense); Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926) (stating that certain uses of property are so egregious
that the owner "surrenders his control at his peril"); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (stating that "whether the reason ... be artificial or real, it
is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced"); Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878) (stating that the acts
of the possessors bind the owners whether the owners are innocent or guilty); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. 1 (1827) (stating that the property is the offender).
62. Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas, who were in the majority
in the instant case, disagreed with the Austin Court's assertion that forfeiture of property was
based on the owner's negligence. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 623-28 (Scalia,
J., concurring), 628-29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This may explain the instant Court's retreat
from a negligence basis for forfeiture in the instant case.
63. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
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reversing its determination in Austin.' 4 As Justice Stevens asserts, the
majority's holding in the instant case is inconsistent with its holding in
Austin.

65

If the instant Court is reversing its determination in Austin that forfeiture
is grounded on the negligence of the owner, it does so incorrectly.66 In
examining the two theories of forfeiture of property owned by innocent
persons, it is clear that the theories cannot stand without introducing the
personal negligence of the property owner as expressed in Austin. 67 The
theory that the property itself is "guilty," as stated in The Palmyra, grew out
of early maritime law which recognized the difficulty of convicting owners
of ships that have committed crimes when the owner likely resided in another
country.6s However, this rationale is not compelling in modem cases since
the owner, as in the instant case, is usually within the jurisdiction of the
69
court.
The second theory for property forfeiture belonging to innocent
persons is that owners are vicariously or strictly liable for the illegal use of
their property by persons to whom they have given consent to use the
property. 70 However, as Justice Stevens states in his dissent, vicarious and
strict liability are imposed to ensure that victims are compensated for their
injuries.71 Conversely, in the case of forfeiture, there is no victim who must
be compensated.72 Even if one considers society to be the victim, the
offender repays the debt through the criminal proceedings. Thus, as the
Court concluded in Austin, present-day forfeiture must be based on the
negligence of owners in allowing their property to be used illegally.73
Therefore, if forfeiture is, in fact, based on the negligence of the owner
then there must always be some level of negligence or wrongdoing on the
part of the property owner to justify a forfeiture.74 Thus, Justice Stevens
concludes that due process prohibits the forfeiture of property belonging to

64. See id. at 1007. Justice Stevens states, "The majority... ignores [the Austin Court's]
detailed analysis of our case law without explanation or comment." Id. (Stevens, J,
dissenting).
65. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
68. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1992) (Justice
Blackmun, stating that "the fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand
the reach of the courts and to furnish remedies for aggrieved parties").
69. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
70. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
71. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Tort law is tied to the goal
of compensation.").
72. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618-19.
74. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is conceded that
petitioner was in no way negligent").
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an owner who is innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence.7"7 6 Under this
analysis, the forfeiture in the instant case violates due process.
The Supreme Court's decision will continue the increasing use of
forfeiture as a weapon in the criminal justice system. The Court relies on
past traditions to justify the civil forfeiture of property belonging to innocent
owners. However, the Austin Court's holding compels this Court to declare
that the forfeiture of property belonging to innocent owners is a violation of
due process if owners can show they are innocent of any wrongdoing or
negligence.77 Additionally, the Court's decision weakens the foundation on
which its holding in Austin was based: forfeiture is grounded on the owner's
negligence. 78 The Court's decision removes civil forfeitures from the
protections of the Constitution,79 and leaves it to the states and the federal
government to ensure that forfeitures are not used improperly.8 °

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

79. See Aaron Epstein, Court OKs Dual Attack on Dealers: Property Seizures Legal,

Justices Say, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 1996, at IA. The Court decided in an 8-1 ruling that
prosecutors may continue to bring both criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture proceedings
against criminals without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. (discussing United States
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)). This follows the Court's holding in the instant case and
signals that the Court feels that civil forfeiture does not fall within the protections of the
Constitution.
80. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated:
Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to
raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably
misused

. . .

than a component of a system of justice. When the property sought

to be forfeited has been entrusted by its owner to one who uses it for crime,
however, the Constitution apparently assigns to the States and to the political
branches of the Federal Government the primary responsibility for avoiding that
result.

